Grand Valley State University

ScholarWorks@GVSU
Honors Projects

Undergraduate Research and Creative Practice

2014

First Female Directors: Market Response
Elizabeth Fredericks
Grand Valley State University

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/honorsprojects
Recommended Citation
Fredericks, Elizabeth, "First Female Directors: Market Response" (2014). Honors Projects. 313.
http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/honorsprojects/313

This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Research and Creative Practice at ScholarWorks@GVSU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@GVSU. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gvsu.edu.

First Female Directors: Market Response
Elizabeth Fredericks and Professor Vijay Gondhalekar

Abstract
There has been an ongoing debate over women’s impact on corporations, specifically in top
executive roles. This study looks at the stock price reaction to the appointment of the first female
to the board of directors of Fortune 250 companies. Using the Fama-French three factor model
we observed the abnormal stock price reaction that occurred when a company announced the
first woman being appointed. Analysis revealed that although the initial stock price reaction was
zero, the post-five year returns were statistically significantly positive. This is the first study to
show that having a woman on a firm’s board of directors increases firm performance and adds
value, suggesting that women should indeed have a place in top management in the business
world.

Keywords: Stock Returns, Board of Directors, Women, Fortune 250, Fama-French
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1. Introduction
For most of the era of big businesses, men have been in control of the companies and the
board rooms. However, there has recently been a shift in society’s opinions, creating pressure for
companies to have a woman on their board of directors. Recent studies have looked into whether
or not having a woman on the board of directors is beneficial to a firm; results have been
inconclusive, with some studies showing women are beneficial, but other analysis shows a
woman’s effect can be neutral or slightly negative. In this study, we are looking at how the
appointment of the first woman to a board of directors affects the appointing company’s stock
performance, both before, on, and after the date of announcement. Previous studies have focused
on a company’s Return on Equity (ROE) and Total Return to Shareholders (TRS) once a female
is a part of top management (Catalyst, 2004) while others have found that women can make a
difference in financial reporting decisions (Francis, Hasan, Park, Wu, 2014) once there are
enough strong, independent directors on the board of the company (Fogel, Ma, Morck, 2014).
Different from these studies, our study focuses on the stock price reactions relevant to the exact
date of announcement of the first female appointed to the board of directors for Fortune 250
companies. Most studies focus on what happens when there are multiple females in top positions,
but this study focuses solely on the first female appointed, setting it apart in its significance.
In analyzing the stock performance of companies who have announced the appointment
of the first female to their board of directors, we have focused on the stock prices from three
years before the date of announcement, to five years after. We have also focused the analysis to
the date of announcement and analyzed stock performance from ten, five, three, and one day
before and after the date of announcement, as well as the actual date of announcement. It has yet
to be fully proven whether markets are efficient or inefficient, with differing schools of financial
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beliefs having proof of both options. As a result, our findings can be interpreted in light of an
inefficient market and in light of an efficient market. In an inefficient market, newly released
information is not reflected in the stock price of a company at a rapid pace. As a result, the
market’s reaction to the announcement of a female appointment to the board of directors may not
be correct at the time of announcement, causing the market to adjust with time. In an efficient
market, all information and new announcements are assumed to already be reflected in the price
of a company’s stock. Depending on how the market views the announcement and the changes
taking place, in an efficient market, the stock price reaction to the appointment announcement
can be positive, negative, or neutral.
In the following section we introduce a review of current literature pertaining to the
presence of females on a company’s board of directors and the effect the presence of these
females has on the company’s performance. In section 3, our hypothesis is detailed. In section 4,
an analysis of the data and methodologies used to conduct this study are presented. In section 5
we discuss the findings of the study as well as the impact these findings have on the performance
of a company. How this information should be used in the future when companies are appointing
new members to the board of directors is also discussed. Section 6 concludes. A table of the
appointment dates of the first woman to the board of directors for all of the companies analyzed
can be found in the appendix.

2. Survey of the Literature & Hypothesis
The current literature on the effects of females in the corporate boardroom is not all
encompassing, but does provide a good overview of the different decision-making qualities and
other aspects that females bring to a company. As society becomes more aware and involved
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with the issue of few women being at the top of corporations, articles on the subject can be found
in places beyond academic journals. For example, in the CNN article “What Changes With
Women in the Boardroom?” the firm The Garden City Group is highlighted, due to 8 of their 15
board members being women. This firm has performed very well financially, in part due to the
way women consider decisions differently than their male counterparts (Wallace, 2013). Women
look at risk differently than men do, and overall tend to take fewer risks. During the most recent
economic downturn, all funds incurred an average loss of 19%, but the funds run by women
incurred an average loss of only 10% (Wallace, 2009). Having women in the boardroom clearly
has an effect on the company’s performance, but current literature argues that the gender of
board members is not the sole factor behind these firm valuation changes.
There is conflicting evidence as to whether the impact of having a woman on the board of
directors or as CEO has a positive or a negative impact on firms. There is no arguing though that
having a woman in top management does have an impact on the company’s performance.
Thomas Schmid and Daniel Urban (2013) postulate that having women on the board of directors
does lead to a higher firm valuation, but that higher valuation is strongly dependent on the level
of development in the country where the firm is located. In their paper “Does It Matter Where
You Work? International Evidence on Female Board Representation,” Schmid and Urban state
that it is a country’s culture that affects the number of women on a board of directors, and the
culture, the main determinant for female board representation, in fact has no impact on the firm’s
valuation.
Almost all of the current literatures on females in the boardroom mention the differences
between males and females, with regard to risk, in some capacity. Many simply mention that
females are more risk averse, and take into consideration more factors when deciding which
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projects and risks the firm should undertake. Nadia Loukil and Ouidad Yousfi believe that “In
the presence of women on the board, firms rely more on internal funds to finance investments
than debt.” Women tend to be less competitive and “overconfident” than their male counterparts
(Loukil & Yousfi). This results in the least risky source of financing being used first and the
most risky source, issuing new equity, being used as a last resort; this is a direct example of the
Pecking Order Theory that is commonly discussed in the financial world. However in certain
firms, particularly banking firms, women have a much different level of risk-aversion than
women who do not enter the finance industry (Sapienza, Zingales, & Maestripieri, 2009). This
may be due in part to the qualities a woman has that propel her towards a career in finance. In
their article, Loukil and Yousfi also find that having women in a boardroom helps to lower the
absences of male board members; this can result in better decisions being made for the firm by
the board of directors as a whole (Loukil & Yousfi). Sila, Gonzalez, & Hagendorff found that
“the degree of risk aversion in women may vanish when they have broken through the glass
ceiling in order to adapt themselves to a male-dominated culture…they find that female directors
are more risk loving than their male counterparts” (2014). Perhaps a portion of the effect that
female board members have on firm valuation is in part due to the females trying to prove their
value and worth to their male contemporaries. With so many companies trying to bridge the
gender gap, current literature has not yet revealed what exactly causes the change to firm
valuation that women cause.
Males and females in top management take different approaches with regard to corporate
financial reporting and accounting decisions. Statistically speaking, when the gender of a firm’s
CFO changes from male to female, there is a significant increase in the level of accounting
conservatism, and a significant decrease when the change is from female to male. The decisions
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a corporation announces reflect the personal risk preferences and decisions of top management.
Hence, the changes seen with a female in charge reflect the more conservative and risk adverse
nature women at the top tend to have. Firms that are controlled by females grow more slowly and
make fewer acquisitions, but the acquisitions that are made provide much higher announcement
returns (Francis, Hasan, Park, & Wu, 2014). Having board members that favor differing levels of
risk is important, since it is these “independent” directors that will challenge wayward CEOs.
Powerful independent directors are able to raise shareholder valuations by “preventing valuedestroying decisions, by meaningfully linking CEO pay to firm performance, and by forcing out
underperforming CEOs” (Fogel, Ma, & Morck, 2014). The differences in levels of conservatism
and in financial reporting are linked to the personal preferences of top management. It is in the
best interest of a company that top management be composed of some independent directors,
including females, as these individuals are able to raise shareholder valuations and make
acquisitions that provide higher returns.
The current literature on gender diversity in the boardroom focuses on a variety of
aspects, resulting in inconclusive results when taken together. The analysis appears to be
conflicting, agreeing only in the fact that women on the board of directors do have an impact.
What exactly is that impact still remains to be seen; however, it is clear that women approach
risk and decision-making in a different way than men do. Having a variety of opinions in a
boardroom can only improve the quality of the decisions being made. It is the purpose of this
study to attempt to fill in some of the gaps in current literature; we plan to do this by determining
whether the presence of a woman in the boardroom does in fact impact the value of a firm’s
stock.
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3. Hypothesis
Factoring in all of our research and our knowledge of financial markets, our hypothesis
for this study is as follows, with an explanation following: We hypothesize that the
announcement of the first woman to a company’s board of directors may result in a positive,
negative, or neutral market response, depending on an efficient or inefficient market state.
3.1 Inefficient Markets
When markets are inefficient, the prices of common stocks and other similar securities
are not always accurately priced. This implies that market forces are able to drive asset prices
above or below their true, actual price in an inefficient market. When a female is appointed to the
board of directors in such a market, the market reaction may be to over – or under – estimate the
value of having a female director. Assuming that the market does not have prior experience with
this type of announcement, as is the case when the female is the first appointed for that selected
company, the market will very easily underreact or overreact initially. The initial under reaction
implies that investors do not perceive the value a female adds to a board of directors. When the
initial investor reaction is that the announcement adds more value to the company than it actually
does, an overreaction occurs. Over time, the inefficient market adjusts to the true value added by
adding a female to the board of directors. If the initial response was an overreaction, the stock
prices will fall; if the initial response was an under reaction, the stock prices will rise. There are
times when an announcement is muted in an inefficient market. This causes the reaction to spill
over into subsequent years, and the post-announcement market price adjustment to occur over a
longer period of time. It is very difficult to ascertain the true value of a stock or the true investor
reaction to a company’s announcement in an inefficient market, but over time the market will
adjust back to the true values.
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3.2 Efficient Markets
According to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), in an efficient market it is
impossible to “beat the market” because stock market efficiency causes existing share prices to
always incorporate and reflect all relevant information (Investopedia, 2014). “In an efficient
market, the expected part of the earnings increase should already be reflected in the price” (Ball,
1994). In efficient markets, the investors’ response to the announcement of the first female
elected to a board of directors will immediately be reflected in the share price of the company’s
stock. When female representation is perceived to be a good thing, the market will reflect a
positive reaction through an increase in the price of the stock. When the majority of the users of
a product or service are female, women’s voices on a board will add benefit, with the gender
diversity helping to increase profit margins (VanderMey, 2013). This positive reaction may
occur if the company and its investors value diversity of opinion. Having a diverse group of
opinions provides more diverse angles for evaluating problems and decisions, resulting in a
decrease in likely herd behavior. A diverse group of opinions in the boardroom can also be
valuable in crisis situations, where corporate performance may depend on the different
viewpoints directors of different backgrounds have (Adams & Ragunathan, 2013). When a
woman is selected to become the first female on a company’s board of directors, she is very
likely to be of an exceptional quality and have outstanding capabilities. A company should only
select directors that will provide the most benefit to the firm, so each director selected will have
very high qualifications, whether male or a female. The exceptional qualities that the selected
female provides to the board will increase the insights and level of oversight provided by the
board. She is also very likely to be a strong independent thinker, helping her to reach this
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position. Firms with powerful independent boards have economically and statistically higher
firm valuations (Fogel, Ma, & Morck, 2014).
When comparing males and females, women tend to be the more nurturing of the two,
and female directors bring this trait with them to every board of directors on which they hold a
position. When given an increase in resources, females spend more money on children (Doepke
& Tertilt, 2014). Carried over to a board of directors, one can assume that when females have
more control over the financial resources of a company, they will be more inclined to share the
wealth with their investors; this is something that encourages a positive response in investors and
helps to cause a positive stock price reaction to the announcement of a female being appointed to
a company’s board of directors. The increased expenditure of women on children, relative to
spending on pleasure, also relates to the fact that females tend to have more of a long-term
perspective than males. The ability to plan for the long-term and maintain a long-term
perspective, whilst still focusing on the short-term, is very important for any company. By
adding a female to the board of directors in possession of this ability, investors are encouraged
about the health of the company, causing the stock price to increase. Finally, electing the first
female to the board of directors sends a signal to the rest of the market that this company is pathbreaking and making changes to improve company performance. Anytime a company is making
changes to improve, this is seen in a positive light by investors, and the positive attention
translates to an increase in company stock price, a better top line and bottom line for the
company, and improved costs of capital for the firm. Investors who realize the value the first
female elected to a board of directors brings to that company reflect their approval via the
positive reaction seen in the market value of the company.
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When an announcement is made by a company that the financial markets view as being
neither positive nor negative, the stock price reaction is neutral. A neutral market reaction to the
announcement of the first female elected to the board of directors occurs when that female is
perceived to be a “trophy director,” so to speak. The first female elected to a board is always at a
disadvantage, as she is trying to navigate her way in the director’s world of men. Women in this
position may not be comfortable standing out, at least initially, and may not want to rock the
boat, causing their talent to stay hidden and muted. When this is the case, the female director’s
talent does not translate into any differences for the company; it is essentially the same as before
the appointment, except that the gender diversity box has been checked. If investors perceive this
to be the case, they will not have much of a reaction to the female being elected, causing the
market valuation of the company to essentially stay the same. In some cases a company may be
known for selecting the best available talent when voting for the new member of their board of
directors. If this is the case, investors will be aware of this fact and the election of the first
woman will have no impact, since she is the best talent available; there is nothing extra brought
to the table just because she is female. Investors would solidify this reasoning if their reaction to
the announcement of the first female director of a company was relatively neutral, or close to
zero, and not significant.
There are certain instances that have led us to believe that the announcement of the first
female elected to a company’s board of directors may cause a negative market reaction. It is well
documented in finance research that women are more risk-averse than men. This may be
beneficial during an economic downturn, helping to limit losses during these times. But, given
that recessions are short-lived relative to expansions, the overall effect of women being riskaverse would be negative. Female’s risk-aversion may prevent them from fully maximizing the
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benefits presented by an economic upswing. Men are more likely to use additional funds for
investments, and this is the action that companies should be taking during a bull market (Doepke
& Tertilt, 2014). Equity can be thought of as a Call option on the value of the assets of a
company and hence, a risk-averse investment stance will reduce the value of the option (i.e. the
equity of the firm). This will be reflected as a negative market reaction to the announcement of
the female being elected.
There are instances where the first female elected to a company’s board of directors were
not elected because of the skills and talent she would bring to the company, but rather so that the
company could place a checkmark in their diversity box. When this is the case, the female
appointment does not serve any real purpose or add any value to the company. Given no priors
since it is the first female elected, this appointment may be an adjustment for both the men on the
board and the new female director; a dysfunctional board may be the result. When a board is
dysfunctional, it will not be able to lead the company in the best possible direction, which
investors will understand and reflect in a negative stock price valuation. The first female
directors had no female role models, so they may not want to come across as strong and may not
be clear about their role on the board. Board members must be aware of their specific role as a
director, and how they are expected to help improve company performance, in order for the
company to actually improve. It is very rare that a company will improve when director roles are
not understood, which will be reflected in the market’s valuation of the company. If investors
believe any of these things about the company or the female selected when the announcement is
made that a female is the newest board member, we will see a negative price reaction very soon,
if not immediately after, the announcement and the information is released to the public.
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Whether the market is efficient or inefficient plays a role in how we predict investors to
react to the announcement of the first female appointment to the board of directors. The value the
market places on a female being elected will help prove whether it truly is beneficial for a
company to have at least one woman serving on its board of directors.

4. Data and Methodology
4.1 Data
Larcker and Tayan (2013) surveyed the 2012 Fortune 250 companies for
information on the first women appointed to their board of directors. These are large publicly
traded US companies. We could identify the exact date (month, day and year) of the appointment
of the first woman to the board of directors in 16 cases and for another 18 companies we could
find the month and year of the first women director appointment (in such cases we decided to
take the middle of the month as the date of appointment). This gave us a sample of 34 companies
(out of the Fortune 250 companies for the year 2012). We ended up dropping 5 companies from
the sample because either the company became public after the date of appointment or stock
price information ended prior to the date of appointment. Our final sample size therefore turns
out to be 28 (see Table 1).
4.2 Methodology
We use the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model augmented with the momentum
factor as in Carhart (1994) for assessing abnormal stock price reaction when a company
announces that it is appointing a woman for the first time to its board of directors. The date of
announcement is taken as day zero in our analysis. The four-factor model is based on the notion
that expected returns are generated based on the following equation,
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Rjt = αj + βmj(Rmt) + βsj(SMBt) + βvj(HMLt) + βuj(UMDt) + εjt
Where Rjt, and Rmt are the daily return on stock J and the market portfolio respectively. SMBt is
the difference between the daily return on a portfolio of small stocks and big stocks (small minus
big). HMLt is the difference between the daily return on a portfolio of high book-to-market
equity ratio stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market equity ratio (high minus low; this
roughly corresponds to the difference between value and growth stocks). UMDt is the difference
between the daily return on short-term winner stocks and loser stocks (up minus down). The last
term in the equation (εjt) represents random error. The slope coefficients in the above equation
(market beta, size beta, value beta, and momentum beta: βmj, βsj, βvj, βuj) represent the sensitivity
of stock J to common and hence non-diversifiable factors in stock returns.
The period [day -279, day -30] relative to day zero is used as the estimation period for
computing abnormal returns around the date of announcement (days -10 through day +10). In
other words, parameters of the above model are computed via running a regression of the return
on the stock Rjt against Rmt, SMBt, HMLt and UMDt based on the 250 days between [day -279,
day-30] for each stock in our sample. These estimated parameters are used for forecasting returns
during the announcement period [day -10, day+10] for each stock in the sample. The actual
return minus the forecasted return is taken as the abnormal return for that day for a given stock.
The abnormal returns are averaged across all the stocks for assessing the average abnormal
return for a given day (reported in the tables). This provides an assessment of the market reaction
specific to the event of a company appointing for the first time, a women to its board of directors.
We also examine long-term abnormal returns before and after the date of announcement
(year -3 through year +5) (See Tables 3 & 4). Our thinking is that the first female directors may
take time to have a meaningful impact on their companies and/or the equity market may take
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longer to fully understand and incorporate the impact of female directors on the prospects of the
companies in share prices. In this long-term analysis, we use monthly returns rather than daily
returns. We use 36 monthly observations spanning the period (month -35, month-2) for
estimating parameters in assessing the cumulative abnormal returns over the five years after the
appointment to the board of directors. For assessing the cumulative abnormal returns during the
three years prior to the appointment of the first woman to the board of directors, we use 36
monthly observations spanning the period (month -71, month -38) as the parameter estimation
period.

5. Findings & Analysis
Upon completion of running our tests, interesting results were found. Using the FamaFrench-Momentum Time-Series Model, Value Weighted Index, we found that in the five days
prior to the announcement of the new director, there was a positive stock price reaction. This
implies that investors were optimistic about the talent a new director would bring to the
company, and felt that whoever the new director was, he or she would be the best talent available
and have a positive impact on the company. However, in the five days after the announcement of
a female being appointed as the new director, there was a statistically significant negative
reaction. In an efficient market, there could be a variety of reasons for this reaction, including the
belief that females are more risk-averse and that the female may only be a “trophy director;”
there solely to check off the company’s diversity box. When analyzing the results from the
perspective of an inefficient market, the negative reaction seen may be an under reaction and
time is needed for the market to correct itself.
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When the analysis was extended to cover a longer period of time, post-announcement, we
found that there was a positive reaction. Both one year and five years after the announcement of
the first woman being elected to a company’s board of directors, there was a statistically
significant positive reaction in the market. In an inefficient market, this positive reaction is the
market correcting itself, over time, from the initial under reaction that occurred in the days
following the announcement. In an efficient market, the positive reaction implies that investors
see the value and talent a woman brings to a board of directors. With a significant positive
reaction so long after the announcement, one can assume that the female director did in fact have
an impact on the company and helped to increase the company’s value. One reason for this may
be the long-term perspective a woman brings, or the different way of viewing risk. If the woman
had not had an impact on the company, we would have seen a neutral response over time. A
negative reaction would have been found had the woman impacted the company in a negative
way and lowered the company’s value over time. The positive reaction found implies that having
women on a company’s board of directors does, in fact, increase the value of a firm, and
improves the company overall.
We also ran cross-sectional regressions comparing abnormal returns from different time
periods related to the announcement of female appointment to the board of directors, as seen in
Table 5. In comparing the cumulative abnormal returns from five days to one day prior (-5, -1) to
the date of announcement with the cumulative abnormal return from one day to five days after
(1, 5) the date of announcement, we found a statistically significant positive relationship. In
comparing the long-term cumulative abnormal returns to announcement period returns (day -5,
day -15), the relationship found was not statistically significant, meaning that the long-term
returns are not related to announcement period returns. This holds true after it is revealed that the
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newly elected director is female, as shown through the regression between (month 1, month 60)
and (day +1, day +5) having no statistical significance. These results show that neither is the
market inefficient nor is the announcement period reaction suggesting a negative reaction to
female appointment. Further research may reveal the reasons for these regression results.

6. Conclusion
Within in the past few decades, American society has rallied for women’s rights, and
fought for women to be thought of, and compensated, equally to men. Over time, more Fortune
500 companies have appointed at least one female to their board of directors. When the first
female is appointed to a company’s board of directors, the media displays this as a positive
action, one that benefits women everywhere. However, no study had ever been completed to see
if the first woman appointed truly had an impact on the company and increase firm performance
and value, as seen through the market’s reaction and company share prices. The goal of this
study was to accomplish that goal and determine if having females on boards of directors does,
in fact, have a positive impact on the company.
Through research and thorough data testing and analysis, it was found that initially the
market reaction to the appointment of the first female to a board of directors is significantly
negative. However, over time, specifically one and five years after the announcement, the market
reaction and company share price are significantly positive. For instance, five years after the
announcement, the mean cumulative abnormal return was 33.09%, meaning that the company’s
value increased by 33% in the five years after a female joined the board of directors. This implies
that having at least one female on a board of directors does greatly benefit a company, as seen
through the performance of the companies in our sample.
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Females offer different skills and talents than males. Females tend to have a more longterm perspective, whereas males focus more on the short-term and increasing profits now.
Women are also more likely to make decisions that return profits to investors, via dividends,
increasing positive investor responses. The differences in the ways males and females view risk
helps the board of directors to make more thorough decisions, through examining more aspects
of a problem or decision than they normally would have. Having diversity on a board of directors
most times increases a company’s performance. Since the ultimate goal of every business is to
make money, firms need to have the best directors possible, who will make the right decisions
for the company. Having the best group of directors possible should include women.
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Table 1
Company
Amazon
Aon
AT&T
Baxter
Capital One Financial
Cardinal Health
Conagra
Costco Wholesale
CVS
Dominion Resources
Edison International
Entergy
FedEx
Ford Motor Company
General Dynamics
HealthNet
Humana
Huntsman
Illinois Tool Works
International Paper
Johnson & Johnson
Johnson Controls
Land O’Lakes
Marathon Petroleum
McDonald’s
Pacific Gas & Electric
Parker Hannifin
Penske
PepsiCo
Starbucks
Tech Data
Travelers
Waste Management
WellPoint Financial
WellPoint Financial

Director
Patricia Stonesifer
Joan Manley
Catherine Cleary
Mary Johnston Evans
Ann Fritz Hackett
Regina Herzlinger
Louise Kinney Platt
Jill Ruckelshaus
Patricia Carry Stewart
Mary Fray
Carla Anderson Hills
Lucie Fjeldstad
Judith Estrin
Marian Heiskell
Mary Barra
Gale Fitzgerald
W. Ann Reynolds
Marsha Evans
Susan Crown
Jane Pfeiffer
Joan Cooney
Martha Seger
Connie Cihak
Donna James
Terry Savage
Doris Leonard
Debra Starnes
Kimberley McWaters
Joan Crawford Steele
Barbara Bass
Kathleen Misunas
Jewel Plummer Cobb
Pastora San Juan Cafferty
Susan Bayh
Bessie LaRae Orullian

Appointment Date
February 15, 1997
May 15, 1984
April 15, 1972
May 15, 1986
October 28, 2004
August 15, 1995
January 15, 1973
February 15, 1996
November 15, 1996
December 17, 1971
February 15, 1977
February 2, 1992
March 15, 1989
March 11, 1976
March 15, 2011
March 15, 2001
January 15, 1991
August 15, 2005
May 6, 1994
June 14, 1977
April 11, 1978
May 31, 1984
February 15, 1994
June 30, 2011
December 15, 1990
September 26, 1973
July 21, 1997
December 15, 2004
April 15, 1959
January 1, 1996
April 5, 2000
September 6, 1974
July 15, 1998
July 17, 2001
July 17, 2001
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Table 2: Short-Term Returns

Days
(-5 , +5)
(-3 , +3)
(-1 , +1)
(0 , 0)
(-5 , -1)
(+1 , +5)

Mean
Cumulative
Abnormal
Return
0.27%
0.32%
-0.85%
-0.45%
2.02%
-1.31%

Median
Cumulative
Abnormal Return

Positive:
Negative

CSectErr
t

Rank
Test Z

0.51%
0.41%
-0.55%
-0.16%
1.69%
-0.88%

14:14
16:12
12:16
9:19(
20:8>
10:18

0.224
0.325
-1.161
-1.284
2.986**
-2.374*

-0.146
-0.485
-1.155
-1.26
2.330*
-2.384*

CsectErr tstat
Bootstrap+
0.224
0.325
-1.161
-1.284
2.986**
-2.374*

The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels,
respectively, using a two-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the direction
and generic one-tail significance of the generalized sign test.

+ The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001
levels, respectively using a two-tail nonparametric bootstrap of the indicated test.
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Table 3: Returns after the Appointment Announcement
Mean
Cumulative
Abnormal
Return

Years
1
2
3
4
5
Cumulative (1 , 3)
Cumulative (1, 5)

10.17%
4.05%
-0.15%
6.93%
14.07%
13.93%
34.20%

Median
Cumulative
Abnormal Return
10.95%
4.86%
2.81%
4.60%
12.04%
27.81%
39.91%

Positive:
Negative
17:10
17:9)
14:11
13:12
14:09
18:9)
20:7>>

CSectErr
t
1.817$
0.708
-0.023
0.930
1.879$
1.211
2.089*

Rank
Test Z
1.399
0.208
-0.634
0.533
2.243*
0.562
1.827$

CSectErr tstat
Bootstrap+
1.817$
0.708
-0.023
0.93
1.879*
1.211
2.089*

The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels,
respectively, using a two-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the direction and
generic one-tail significance of the generalized sign test.

+ The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels,
respectively using a two-tail nonparametric bootstrap of the indicated test.
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Table 4: Returns Prior to the Appointment Announcement
Mean
Cumulative
Abnormal
Return

Years
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
Cumulative (-3 ,-1)
Cumulative (-5 , -1)

-11.61%
-1.16%
-9.52%
-9.45%
-11.16%
-30.13%
-42.90%

Median
Cumulative
Abnormal
Return
-8.26%
4.93%
-15.17%
-11.05%
-9.13%
-16.53%
-29.75%

Positive:
Negative

CSectErr
t

9:14
12:11
8:15
8:15
8:15
6:17<
8:15

-1.703$
-0.150
-1.338
-1.625
-1.406
-1.751$
-1.972*

Rank
Test Z
-1.119
0.023
-0.554
-0.581
-1.245
-1.374
-1.554

CSectErr t-stat
Bootstrap+
-1.703$
-0.150
-1.338
-1.625
-1.406
-1.751
-1.972*

The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels,
respectively, using a two-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the direction and
generic one-tail significance of the generalized sign test.

+ The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels,
respectively using a two-tail nonparametric bootstrap of the indicated test.
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Table 5: Cross-Sectional Regressions
Dependent
Variable

CAR (day 1, day
5)

CAR (month 1, month
60)

CAR (month 1, month
60)

CAR (month 1, month
60)

Intercept

-0.020
(-3.96)***

0.279
(1.89)*

0.368
(2.04)**

0.347
(2.18)**

CAR (day -5, day -1)

0.346
(3.23)***

-1.323
(-0.23)
-4.558
(-0.75)

CAR (day 1, day 5)

-1.559
(-0.55)

CAR (day -5, day 5)
Adj. R2
Sample size

0.15
28

0.00
27

0.00
27

0.00
27

The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively, using a
two-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the direction and generic one-tail significance of the
generalized sign test.
The numbers in parenthesis indicate t-statistics.
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